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The agricultural sector, particularly the livestock industries,  are in a period
of major change and transition. This transition is commonly referred to as the
industrialization of agriculture.  Since Tom Urban popularized this term in an
often cited article in Choices, many have asked what it really means. What is this
threatening,  insignificant  (or  at  best  not  new)  or  innovative  and  creative
transition (depending  upon your viewpoint) in agriculture?
Industrialization of agriculture seems to defy definition (everyone has their
own perspective), but let us try to describe it. A short, simple description might
be: The application of modern industrial  manufacturing, production, procure-
ment, distribution and coordination concepts to the food and industrial product
chain.
What are the themes or dimensions ofthis process? The following di Acussion
will develop seven themes of industrialization:  a manufacturing  ment-ality;  a
systems approach;  separation and realignment; negotiated coordination;  risk;
power and control, and information. Then we will identify seven policy issues
that this process will impact and that will likely require new or different policy
responses.
The Themes of Industrialization
A Manufacturing Mentality
ManufacturingFoodProducts  vs. Producing  Commodities-The  transition
of agriculture  from a commodity industry to one with differentiated products,
especially when combined with a focus on the food consumer and a manufac-
turing approach to production, is a dramatic paradigm shift for the industry. The
produce and then sell mentality ofthe commodity business is being replaced by
the strategy of  first asking consumers what they want as attributes in their food
products  and then creating or manufacturing those  attributes in the products.
This may, in fact, require changes in how the raw material is produced and what
it doesn't contain (i.e.  chemical residues), as well as what it does contain.
Systemization andRoutinization-One  ofthe characteristics ofthe manufac-
turing process is systemization and routinization. With increased understanding
and ability to control the biological production process, routinization becomes
increasingly possible. Tasks become more programmable. Routinization gen-
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managerial oversight and overhead. Thus, agricultural production is  becoming
more of a science and  less of an art.
Specialization-An  additional manufacturing mentality concept now being
utilized in modem production systems  is that of specialization,  not only with
respect  to  business  venture  and  focus,  but  also  with  respect  to  individual
employee tasks or function. This specialization is increasingly feasible because
of better understanding and control of the biological  process.
Scheduling and Utilization-A further  implication  of the manufacturing
paradigm in agricultural production is increased emphasis on facility utilization,
flow scheduling and process control. Many production units have, in essence,
maintained excess plant capacity  as one means of accommodating the uncer-
tainty of the output of the biological production process. But again, as a result
of increased ability to predict and control that process, facility use can be more
accurately predicted and controlled, and process control  concepts to improve
efficiency and reduce cost are more applicable and useful than  in the past.
A Systems  Approach
Systems/Process Flow-The manufacturing  mentality  places  increasing
emphasis on the entire value chain from raw materials supplierto end-user. This
system,  rather than  stage  or  segment  focus,  reduces  the  chances  for  sub-
optimization within a stage or sector and dead-weight losses because stages are
not well  matched  in terms of product flow,  characteristics,  quality  or other
critical  attributes.
Systems Cost-Although cost control is critical in any production system, the
manufacturing approach focused on end-user products recognizes total produc-
tion and distribution  systems cost as being  more critical than the cost in each
stage  of the  value  chain.  And  as  more  resources  are out-sourced,  the  cost
structure of the business  changes with a higher proportion  of the cost being
variable in  nature and a lower proportion fixed. An industry in  which more firms
have  a higher  proportion  of their total costs  that are  variable costs  is more
responsive to changing market conditions.
Input Packages  vs. Mix and  Match Strategies-With  the increasing capacity
to control  and  understand  the biological  process  through biotechnology  and
genetic engineering techniques, producers will be more capable of developing
optimal  input combinations  that match  chemical  and biological  attributes  to
obtain  the optimum  quality and characteristics  of output.  For example,  crop
genetics are being matched to pesticides for optimal pest control as exemplified
by Synchrony STS-a seed/herbicide  system. In some cases the producer will
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biological  and  chemical  characteristics;  in  other cases  the producer  will  be
warned that certain nutritional  and genetic  inputs  respond  better when used
together, and their performance may be sub-optimal if used in other combina-
tions.  But this matched inputs strategy has risks-the risk of  reduced flexibility
and ability to adjust if supplies of an input decrease and/or prices increase.
Separation and Realignment
Separation  of Production  Stages-The  old paradigm  in production agricul-
ture has  been to combine various  stages of production  within one firm-for
example, to combine  in swine production the breeding, gestation,  farrowing,
nursery,  growing  and  finishing  activities  in  one  firm  at  one  location,  and
furthermore to integrate these activities  with feed production and processing.
The new paradigm  is geographic and stage separation of many of  these stages
of production. A further dimension of this separation  is in the ownership and
operation of the resources. More assets in production agriculture are being out-
sourced-for example, 41  percent of the farmland today is owned by a non-
operator compared to 22 percent in 1945 (Wunderlich).  Geographic and stage
separation, in turn, frequently implies larger scale and more specialized capital,
laborand managementresources ateach individual plantsite orfacility location.
Implications of separation for flexibility are unclear-more  specialization  in
resource  use  decreases  flexibility,  but  participation  in  only  one  stage  may
increase the options for negotiating with other partners in other systems, ifother
systems are in the market.
Partnering  and Alliances-At the  same time  that  geographic  and  stage
separation  is occurring,  the  stages  are  being  relinked  by various  forms  of
alliances. Increasingly,  producers are partnering with other resource suppliers
in various ways to expand volume with limited capital outlays. In livestock
production, this phenomena is occurring through contracting arrangements;  a
hog  integrator may own the  breeding, gestation  and farrowing  facilities,  but
contract  out the  nursery  and  growing  phases.  In  essence,  the  integrator  is
leveraging volume by investing his funds in only part of the total fixed assets
needed to produce hogs, while maintaining a high degree of  control of the other
phases  through  the  ownership  of the  livestock  and the specification  of the
growing conditions. The critical dimension of such partnering oralliances is that
more resources and services are out-sourced, if  that is a less expensive technique
for obtaining production inputs, and more linkages up the value chain to the end-
user are used to capture value  in additional  stages of the chain.
Negotiated  Coordination
Spot Markets-Production  agriculture in the past has focused primarily on
commodity products with coordination through impersonal spot markets. The
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for producing specific attributes  in those raw materials  is transforming part of
the agricultural market to a differentiated product market ratherthan a commod-
ity product market. The need for greater diversity, more exacting quality control
and flow control will tax the ability of  spot markets to coordinate production and
processing effectively. Open spot markets increasingly encounter difficulty in
conveying  the full  message  concerning  attributes (quantity,  quality, timing,
etc.) of a product and characteristics  (including services) of a transaction.
Information Flows-Related  to the difficulty of spot markets conveying the
proper  information  is  the speed of information flows and the rate of adoption
with different  coordination  mechanisms.  In general,  negotiated  coordination
results in  more rapid transmission of  information between the various economic
stages, and consequently,  enhanced ability of  the system to adjust to changing
consumer demands, economic conditions or technological  improvements.
This ability to respond quickly to changes in the economic climate is critical
to  maintaining profit margins as well as extracting innovator's profits. Like-
wise, quickly recognizing erroneous decisions and making appropriate adjust-
ments and corrections  are essential to survival  and success.
These  arguments  suggest that,  in traditional  commodity  markets,  where
specific attributes  are not demanded,  supplies are fully adequate  and can be
obtained  from  various  sources,  and  information  flows  between  the  various
stages  is  minimal,  traditional  spot  commodity  markets  can  function  quite
effectively  and efficiently. As one deviates from  these conditions-which  is
increasingly the case with more specificity in raw materials, information flows
and fewer potential  sources of acceptable  supplies-various  forms of negoti-
ated coordination systems become  more effective  and necessary for efficient
functioning of the production and distribution system.
Risk
Sources and  Strategies-Risk  has been a hallmark of the agricultural sector,
and the industrialization of agriculture is both a result of, and has implications
for, the business strategies that will be used to reduce  risk. One risk is that of
prices of inputs or products. A common business strategy is to reduce the risk
of high  prices for inputs  by contracting  for supplies.  A related strategy  is to
reduce the price risk exposure on products by contracting product sales. Some
firms reduce price risks by vertically integrating into the input supply or product
distribution channels.
A second source of risk is related to quantity and/or quality features. Food
packaging and processing unit costs have become very sensitive to operating at
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Matching the physical capacity of various stages (for example, hog finishing
capacity with packing plant kill capacity, or turkey grower space with processor
dressing capacity) is critical to overall efficiency of the system. Furthermore,
some food distribution channels may require particular quality characteristics
which may not be available in predictable quantities in open, spot markets.
A third source or type of  risk in the food chain that has become more serious
in recent years is that of  the safety and health risk in food production. This risk
has  two dimensions,  the health  risk of foodborne  disease;  and the risk of
polluting water, air and land resources in the food production processes. These
risks can result in significant direct costs and liability exposure for not only the
responsible firm in the food chain, but also firms that supply related inputs and
purchase products from the "responsible"  firm in the case of strict (joint and
severable)  environmental  liability  related  to  chemical  use.  Thus,  system
coordination to reduce or control these risks may be in part a response to the
broad sweep of product and environmental  liability law.
Relationship Risk-The expanding use of contractual  and other forms of
negotiation-based  linkages between the various stages within the agricultural
production and distribution system, and the decline in impersonal market-based
transactions, will result in price risk being replaced by relationship or contrac-
tual risk for many agribusiness firms.
Niche Markets-The food  and  industrial  use  markets  for  agricultural
commodities are increasingly characterized as segmented or niche markets that
can appear and disappear rapidly. For many agribusiness firms that are in the
food  processing  and distribution  business,  the  risk of changing  consumer
preferences  or a food safety scare may be a much more critical and important
risk to manage than price or availability  of raw materials. One reason for a
contractual arrangementto source rawmaterials is to reduce price and availabil-
ity risk as well as food safety risk from chemicals, and simultaneously obtain
the attributes needed in the final product from the specific attribute raw material.
Power and Control
Position Power-Traditionally,  discussions  of power  or control  in  an
economic  system  have focused  on issues of size  and the ability to exercise
monopoly  or monosopy power as a function of volume or size-in essence
market dominance. With the increasing importance of the role of information
in  economic decision  making combined with more negotiated  coordination
systems, the potential of economic power associated with a particular stage in
the production and distribution process has surfaced. In essence, the question
is whether there is economic power or control associated with a particular stage
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size power!
Points of Control-The basic argument  is that there are two fundamental
points of control and one fundamental source of power in a negotiation-based
coordinated agricultural production and distribution system. The first point of
control  is the end-user or consumer and those firmns that have intimate contact
with the consumer. Consumers are more discriminating in their food purchases,
want a broader spectrum of attributes in their food products, and increasingly
have the purchasing power to convert wants into effective demand. Those firms
that are close to the end-user and understand the increased specificity of  his/her
demands have a unique capacity to communicate and/or dictate those demands
to the rest of the production and distribution chain.
The second point of control in the agricultural production and distribution
system is the raw material suppliers. But not all raw material suppliers have the
same  degree  of power and  control.  In  essence,  the  relative  control  of raw
material suppliers depends upon the degree of substitutability for their input or
contribution to the production and distribution process. The one input with the
fewest  substitutes-the  most  essential  in  the  agricultural  production  and
distribution chain-is the genetic material in plant and animal production, the
seed  and  breeding  stock.  Biotechnology  and  increased  predictability  and
control of genetic manipulation provides additional power to those who control
genetic material.
Knowledge andInformation-Note  that the points of control in the agricul-
tural  production and distribution chain are at the beginning and the end-the
genetics and the end-user/consumer.  The source of this control is knowledge in
both cases. By the very nature of their business, retailers or food processors and
genetics companies have better access to information at these points of control.
Given that the source of control  is knowledge and  information (not physical
resources, not capital, not land), then the only way a firm between the end-points
of  the end-user and the genetics company can obtain control is through superior
information.  The  implication  is  that  it  is  very  difficult  for  those  in  the
intermediate stages to obtain superior information and, thus, the power base for
control of the system.
At this early  stage  in the process of shifting from  impersonal  markets to
contract or ownership coordination, there may be a first-mover advantage for
very large producers or producers'  cooperatives to play the control role. Thus,
initiative now bythe intermediate firm level may offsetthe perceived advantage
of firms at the end-points.  Coordination  by producers'  cooperatives has the
potential for the more traditional producers to retain a more prominent role. But
unless such  firms make preemptive  moves early in the transformation  from
open markets to closed systems, the opportunity for control will likely be lost.
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An Increasing  Role-The increasing role that knowledge  and  information
play in obtaining control, increasing profits and transferring risk in  the agricul-
tural sector is occurring fortwo fundamental reasons. First, manufacturing food
and industrial  products has become an increasingly sophisticated and complex
business  in contrast to producing  commodities as in the past.  This increased
complexity  means that those with more knowledge  and information about the
detailed processes, as well as how to combine those processes in  a total system
(i.e. the value chain approach), will have a comparative advantage. The second
development is the dramatic growth in knowledge of the chemical, biological
and physical processes involved in  agricultural production. This vast expansion
in knowledge and  understanding means that those who can  sort through  that
knowledge and put it to work in  a practical context have a further comparative
advantage.  Thus, the role of knowledge  and information  in achieving  success
in the  agricultural  industry  is  more  important  today  than  ever  before.
Access to Information-The  logical question then for individuals in  the food
and  industrial  product  manufacturing  chain  is how  to obtain  access  to this
knowledge  and  information.  Historically,  particularly  for  the  independent
producers in the farm sector, this knowledge and information has been obtained
from  public  sources,  as well  as from  external  sources  such as  genetics  and
chemical companies, feed companies,  machinery and equipment manufactur-
ers, packers and processors, etc. In contrast, ownership or contract coordinated
production and distribution systems have sourced their knowledge and informa-
tion from a combination of internal  and external sources.  Many of these firms
or alliances of firms have internal research and development staffs to enhance
their  knowledge  and  information  base.  And  the  knowledge  they  obtain  is
obviously proprietary and not shared outside the firm or alliance; it is a source
of strategic competitive  advantage.
Integrated Systems-The  research  and development  activities  in coordi-
nated systems are more focused on total system  efficiency  and effectiveness
rather than on only individual  components of that system; they are focused on
integrating the nutrition, genetics,  building and equipment design, health and
disease control programs, marketing strategy, etc., rather than on these areas or
topics separately. And in  addition to more effective research and development,
such alliances or integrated firms have the capacity to implement technological
breakthroughs  more rapidly over a  larger volume of output  to obtain  larger
innovator's  profits.  In  the  case  of a defective  new  technology,  ownership/
contract  coordinated  systems  generally  have  more  monitoring  and  control
procedures  in place,  and  can  consequently  detect deteriorating  performance
earlier  and  make  adjustments  more  quickly,  compared  to  a  system  with
impersonal market coordination.
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knowledge and technology  and adapt it rapidly enables the participants  in
that system to more regularly capture and create innovator's profits, while
simultaneously  increasing  control  and  reducing  risk.  This  provides  a
formidable  advantage  to  the ownership/contract  coordinated  production
system compared to the system of independent stages and decision making.
Value of Information-Because  of the  increased value  of information
and the expanding role of the private  sector in providing it, the issue of the
proprietary  nature of, and access to, data and information  becomes  more
important. With the increasing value of information and its use as a strategic
competitive advantage, there is less free exchange of data and information.
If coordinated  production  systems have  the potential  to  obtain  superior
information, how can a producer that is not part of that system obtain access
to similar information to remain competitive? Will you need to become part




An  industrialized  agriculture  provides  yet  another  challenge  to  the
rhetoric, if not the substance, of traditional  farm programs. The rhetoric of
farm commodity programs has long emphasized  maintaining family farms
and a smaller scale, family-based agriculture. In spite of this rhetoric, most
of the farm program payments have been received by larger scale commer-
cial farms, particularly  in the cotton and rice sectors, as well as in feed and
food grains. A second justification of farm programs has been to provide a
safety  net for farmers-to  reduce  the  financial  risk  that they  encounter
because of both price and yield volatility.
Industrialization  of agriculture  may  significantly  undermine  both  of
these traditional arguments  for farm commodity programs. An industrial-
ized  agriculture  will  likely  involve  fewer  family-based  businesses,  and
those  family-based  businesses  that  remain  will  likely  be  operated  and
managed  like  many  other  family-based  businesses  in  other  economic
sectors that do not benefit from price and income support programs. And the
increased use of contract production  may reduce or substantially  mitigate
the price and yield risk faced by industrialized producers, although contract
production will likely introduce additional risk such as relationship risk (i.e.
the potential for unexpected contract termination or nonrenewal),  which is
more  difficult  to  manage  or  transfer  to  others  through  formalized  ex-
changes.
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adjust  to  changes  in  market  conditions  in  similar  fashion  as  any  other
industrialized sector of the economy. It wi 11  be expected to use private sector
risk management strategies to transfer and/or reduce price risk. It would be
expected to more readily and effectively adjust to changing  market condi-
tions with  less support and  assistance from the  public sector.  The public
might even expect and accept a higher financial failure rate as is currently
exhibited  by  and politically  acceptable  for the non-farm,  small  business
sector. At a minimum, industrialization of  agriculture will likely undermine
the political  rhetoric  for  traditional  farm  price and  income  support  pro-
grams, and may provide further support for payment limitations and other
targeting provisions that would focus benefits on family-based  rather than
industrialized agriculture.
Environmental Policy
An  industrialized  agriculture  is  likely  to  be  increasingly  treated  like
manufacturing  or  any  other  industry  when  it  comes  to  environmental
regulation.  Agriculture  has  been  exempt  in  many  instances  from  the
environmental regulation faced  by much of industry, in part because of the
difficulty of  regulating and monitoring non-point compared to point sources
of pollution, and  in  part  because  of the  small  scale of many farm  firms
compared  to the manufacturing  complex.  But as farming and agriculture
become  more industrialized, the rationale  for exemption  from  regulation
becomes  less persuasive. This does not suggest that the agricultural  sector
will  be  subjected  to  more  regulations  than  those  encountered  by  non-
agricultural industries; only that farming will be increasingly brought  into
the  main  stream  of environmental  regulation  and have fewer  exceptions
from the environmental  law of the land.
The environmental consequences of the industrialization  process are not
straight  forward.  As  noted  above,  a  larger  proportion  of  agricultural
production  and resources might be subject to increasingly  stringent envi-
ronmental  regulation,  resulting  in  less  potential  environmental  degrada-
tion.  But with  larger scale units, if there is an environmental accident,  the
consequences  are  more severe because of the  increased  concentration  of
pollutants  as evidenced  by the recent  lagoon accidents  in North Carolina
and other states (National  Hog Farmer, p.  17).
Labor Regulation
Similar to environmental regulation, an industrialized agriculture would
be expected  to be less  exempt from current  labor regulations that  impact
most other industries.  Production agriculture  is one of the more hazardous
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regulated by the Occupational  Safety and Health Administration  (OSHA)
and/or under more recent Worker Protection Standards legislation. Largely
as a function of increased scale as one moves to an industrialized agricul-
ture, but also because of more complexity  in the workplace,  an industrial-
ized  agriculture  would  be  expected  to  encounter  increased  regulation
concerning the work environment and working conditions of its employees.
Furthermore, industrialized agriculture may include more employees (both
skilled and unskilled) and fewer self-employed  individuals. An interesting
policy dilemma will be how the self-employed  and their family members
will be treated under worker protection and other labor regulations as they
become  increasingly  applicable to the agricultural  sector.
Food  Safety
Industrialization  of agriculture  is  in part  a response to increasing  con-
cerns by food processors and retailers, as well as institutional food service
companies, concerning issues of food safety and health as well as nutrition.
And as a consequence of the industrialization  process, food safety regula-
tions may become easier to enforce and lower cost to implement. One of the
significant  implications  of the negotiated  linkages,  which  are part of the
industrialization  process,  is  the  ability  to  more  accurately  and  easily
document the processes used in producing agricultural products, including
chemical  and feed additive  use. Such information  is increasingly valuable
to comply with nutritional  labeling requirements,  as well as to document
compliance  with food  safety and  health  regulations that are increasingly
imposed along the entire food chain. Although industrialization of agricul-
ture  may not suggest  policy  changes  in  this area.  it  is expected  that  the
industry will be more responsive  to these regulations,  and some segments
of the  industry might  view changes  in policy  and  legislation  in  the food
safety and nutrition arena as providing opportunities to differentiate prod-
ucts and obtain  a sustainable competitive  advantage.
Information/Technology  Transfer
The  public  policy  issue  of the  role  of the  public  sector  in  making
information a public good that is broadly available to all potential users, and
the more general issue of intellectual  property rights, become critical with
industrialization of agriculture. The intellectual property rights debate has
historically focused  more on research  and development and new innova-
tions protectable under patent or copyright law. Particularly in agriculture,
the public sector has played a major role in the research  and development
activity, and thus provided broad access to new technology and ideas. In this
context, part of the public purpose was developing and disseminating  new
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and so that individual firms could not restrict access and capture the value
associated with the new idea. The public sector role was that of leveling the
playing field  so that all participants competed  on the same grounds vis-a-
vis access to new ideas and information.
But as  more and more of the research  and development  and  thus new
ideas  come  from  private  sector firms  compared to the public  sector,  and
more of the information  dissemination  system  becomes  privatized,  indi-
vidual  firms  have more potential  to  capture value  at the  expense of end
users. They have the potential to restrict access to new ideas and information
to particular users, thus favoring some producers and excluding others from
the ideas, technology or information necessary for them to be competitive.
The concepts of intellectual property rights, including patent and copyright
law as applied to agriculture, were developed in an era of domestic markets
and national  firms; a relatively  large public  sector research,  development
and information  dissemination system, and a limited role of information as
a  critical  resource.  These  concepts  should  be  reevaluated  in the  current
context of global markets and multi-national business firms; the shrinking
role  of the public  sector  in  research  and development  and  disseminating
information;  and  the  increasing  importance  of information  compared  to
other resources as a source of strategic competitive  advantage.
A related policy  issue  is the  funding of public  information  services.  The
tradition  has been  to provide  most extension  programs  on a free  or nominal
charge basis,  premised  on the argument that public funds have  been  used to
support  the  informnnation  development  and  dissemination  system;  and  that
charging  for  services  would  require  users  to  pay  again,  and  would  also
discriminate against those who do not have the ability to pay. In recent years,
many extension services have faced tighter budgets and are implementing fee
schedules for some infonnation programs. Most ofthese fee schedules are based
on partial  or total  cost recovery.  Thus, in the context of economic principles,
these pricing decisions are supply or cost-driven.
But information,  like any resource,  has a supply and demand function.
And consideration of  the demand or value function can be useful in resource
allocation decisions.  Market-driven  pricing based on the demand function
provides  information  on  the value  of information,  and  is  thus  useful  in
making  decisions  about  how  to  allocate  scarce  extension  resources  to
various forms of information  programming.  Markets  provide  signals and
incentives to do the right thing,  so pricing for services may not only assist
in recovering cost, it may provide significant information that can be used
to  allocate  resources  to  the  highest  payoff  extension  program.  In  that
context, pricing extension programs might make a significant contribution
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trasted with the current supply/provider/cost- driven system of  determining
the proper types of programs.
Clearly, one must always be concerned about issues of market failure that
would allow firms to capture excessive profits or exercise monopoly power in
the information markets, and an important role ofthe public information system
is to mitigate the impacts of those market failures. But one cannot ignore the
potential failure of non-market allocation systems that do not recognize relative
value in providing their product or service-in this case information services.
Markets  and  prices  do provide extremely  valuable  data that can  be  used  in
making socially optimal resource allocation decisions, and this data should not
be summarily  ignored.
Regulation of Structure
Finally, probably one of the most contentious  policy issues precipitated
by the  industrialization of agriculture  is that of the appropriate  regulation
of the  structure  of the  industry.  The  public  policy  issues  here  are  far-
reaching and complex, including the implementation of anti-trust policy to
an increasingly concentrated and integrated food industry; the regulation of
the ownership of farm land, livestock facilities, and other resources used in
production agriculture;  state and/or federal  legislation  and regulations on
the appropriate form of business organization (corporate farming, contract
production, limited partnerships, etc.) and who are appropriate participants
in such business arrangements; contract protection provisions which specify
the rules and the protections available  to various contracting  parties;  and
even  local  county  and  township zoning  regulations  which  influence the
ability of individual  producers  to  construct  new  facilities  or  implement
various farming practices. Concerns about market power and concentration
in  the agricultural  industry might result in  increased  scrutiny  under anti-
trust laws and regulations, although the current posture of limited enforce-
ment under these rules makes that unlikely. More  likely,  state legislators,
concerned  about  the  future  of family  farmers  and  threat  of corporate
farming, may constrain  forms of coordination  arrangements  such as  con-
tract  farming  or  integrated  ownership  of various  stages  of agricultural
production.  Note, however, that such limitations are more  likely to influ-
ence the geographic  location of various activities in the food production and
distribution  chain,  rather  than  the  method  of coordination,  unless  such
legislation  is national  in scope.
Several  broad  policy  options  are  available  to  deal  with the  structural
change  that is occurring  in the agricultural  industry. One option would be
to do nothing-to let the changes take their course within the state and federal
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various  types  of activity  that are  deemed  socially  undesirable.  This  option
precludes  institutional  innovations  that may have  significant  economic  and
social costs and benefits in favor of the status quo. A third option is to impose
better "rules ofthe game" that would level the "playing field" or maybe even give
some participants  an advantage;  or to define the  relative "rights"  of various
parties  in  contracting,  ownership  and  other  negotiated  linkages,  where  the
potential for unfair treatment or exploitation  is a concern. Prompt payment and
custodial account provisions under current legislation for livestock buyers and
grain merchandisers are examples. Other "rules" might relate to contract length,
compensation  if a contract  is terminated early or without cause, and escape
clauses for both the  contractor and contractee,  for example. A public  policy
response  of providing  educational  programs,  legal advice  and mediation  or
negotiation services  to help parties evaluate and  resolve contractual  or other
business linkage conflicts might also be appropriate.
In attempting  to regulate the structure  of agriculture,  particularly  as it
relates to the production sector, public policy makers  should obtain satis-
factory answers to the following  questions:
1.  Do we want to prohibit contracting,  vertical  integration  or similar
activities by any and all parties, or do we only want to prohibit firms over
a certain size or with other characteristics from engaging in these activities?
One way for the public to favor smaller agricultural enterprises over larger
ones would be to enact some sort of progressive tax, where the rate increases
with  size  of the  enterprise.  Perhaps  a  progressive  tax  on  volume  of
production could be used.
The impact of restrictions on existing firms may turn out to be less than
first thought. Firms already engaged in activities covered by the restrictions
may  be able to  restructure  in  ways that circumvent  the  restrictions.  The
$50,000 limit on federal crop subsidies and the 160-acre limit on subsidized
irrigation water in the western states are two examples of restrictions that
some farms  are reported to be circumventing  through  such techniques  as
setting up multiple business entities.
2.  Are there ways to protect market access for independent producers,
other than restricting vertical  integration  or vertical  linkages?  One  way
might be to require processors  to purchase  some minimum percentage  of
their daily kill on the cash-spot market.
3.  Is the  important  question  whether the  alternatives  available  to  a
producer are cash-spot markets or contract alternatives, or is it the number
of alternatives available and the market power of each?  In other words, is
175there  really  any  fundamental  difference  between  a  producer  choosing
among two or three packers to sell to, or signing a contract with one of two
or three contractors?  One obvious difference  is that the choice of packers
is made every week or two, while the choice of contractors is only made once
a year or once every few years, depending  on the length of the contract.
4.  Is  it  more  desirable  for  cooperatives  to  engage  in contracting  with
producers or to vertically  integrate than other corporations or large  privately
held  firms?  One  apparent  concern  with  allowing  existing  cooperatives  to
contract  or  integrate  is that they  might  use  equity  capital  built  up  from
independent producer members' contributions to help other contractee produc-
ers start or expand,  such that they compete with the independents.  Would it be
more desirable to allow new cooperatives to form, which would take advantage
of economies of size, but using only contractee capital?  If there are efficiency
advantages of larger operations, would it  be more desirable for groups of  farmers
to own and operate the operations than others?  Do farmers "wear whiter hats"
than others, in some sense?
5.  What activities  are to be  restricted  or prohibited?  It appears that a
major  concern  is  who  will  be  in  control  of strategic  decisions  in  the
agricultural production and distribution industry. Specific activities should
be evaluated  in  relation  to their roles  as  instruments of control.  How do
owning  livestock or buildings, financing, providing  feed and other inputs,
or marketing relate to control?
6. What is a "contract?"  How is "ownership" of livestock to be defined
and  rules  about  it  to  be  enforced?  Could  a  contractor  circumvent  a
prohibition on ownership  by selling the  animals and feed  to the producer
with an agreement to buy back the market animals under some preset terms?
Are  "profit  sharing"  or  financing  arrangements  to  be  prohibited  or re-
stricted?  Market access  is a key and  legitimate concern.
7. Many producers are concerned  about risk, and contract production  is
one method to manage risk. What other strategies might producers adopt to
manage  risk?  Marketing  contracts,  futures  and  options  trading,  and
contracts that simply guarantee  access to a slaughter facility are possibili-
ties.
8. What are the constitutional  limits on regulatory activities of this type?
It is clear that state and federal  governments  may impose restrictions that
limit activity  contrary  to the "public  good."  But what  is "good"  and for
whom  in this situation?  How will agriculture  commerce  be affected?
176A Final Comment
The structural changes that will impact agriculture over the next decade
will  be  profound.  These  changes  will  include  both  technological  and
institutional innovations. Production agriculture has been very accepting of
technological  innovations-farmers  have generally been eager to try new
hybrids, new chemicals,  new tillage practices,  new feeding regimes, new
equipment,  etc.  Institutional  innovations  or new ways of doing  business
have  been accepted  with more  resistance,  possibly  in  part because  they
change  relationships and frequently substitute  interdependence  for indepen-
dence in the decision making process.
But the economic benefits of the dual dimensions of industrialization of
agriculture-implementation of a manufacturing approach to the food and
industrial  product production and distribution chain, and negotiated coor-
dination  among  the  stages  in  that chain-are  expected  to  dominate  the
economic  and social  cost, resulting in a rapid movement of the livestock
sectors (particularly pork) followed chronologically  by the grain sectors to
an industrial model of production and distribution. The implications of this
industrialization  process for agricultural  policy are  profound.  In essence,
the  underlying  policy  questions  can  be  stated  simply:  (1)  Should  the
industrialization of agriculture be allowed, or should public policy limit or
shape this process so that the end result  is more compatible with what is
perceived by some to be a more acceptable structure of the industry; and (2)
if industrialization  of the agricultural  sector does  occur,  can  one justify
unique policies, like price and income supports, and exemption from other
policies such as worker safety and environmental regulation, for an industry
that is no longer different than other manufacturing and industrial  sectors
of the economy.
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